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Rule 10b-5 and the Stockholder's Derivative
Action
Lewis D. Lowenfels*
Mr. Lowenfels focuses on anew, emerging private cause of action
under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule
10b-5 promulgated thereunder-a stockholders derivative action initiated
on behalf of a corporation which has been defrauded in the purchase or
sale of securities. Though the stockholder's derivative suit has been
traditionally governed by state law, compelling advantages accrue to
the stockholder initiating action pursuant to this section and rule.
The author concludes that as a result, a substantial body of fedral
common law will develop around the section and rule.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides a system for regu-
lating securities trading practices in both the exchange and the over-
the-counter markets. Designed to protect the interests of the investing
public, the provisions of the act seek to curb misrepresentations and
deceit, market manipulations and other fraudulent acts and practices,
and to establish and maintain just and equitable principles of trade
conducive to the maintenance of open, fair and orderly markets.
Section 10(b) of the act is sweeping in its scope:
Sec. 10. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange . . .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors. 1
Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission
pursuant to Section 10(b), is equally encompassing:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
*B.A., Harvard College, 1957; LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1961; Member, New
York Bar, Associate, Marshall, Bratter, Greene, Allison & Tucker, New York City.
1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §
78i(b) (1958).
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of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of circumstances under which they were made, not mislead-
ing, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
2
An examination of the above section and rule may lead one to believe,
first, that they apply only to public dealings (i.e., occurring on an
exchange or in the over-the-counter markets) in securities, and,
second, that they are enforcible only by governmental agencies.
Beginning in 1946,3 however, twelve years after the enactment of
the act, the federal courts have consistently held that section 10(b) ,
and rule 10b-5 are applicable to private dealings in securities4 and
that private persons have standing to sue to redress violations of
rights granted by the above section and rule.5
This article focuses upon a new, emerging private cause of action
based upon section 10(b) and rule 10b-5-a stockholder's derivative
action initiated on behalf of a corporation which has been defrauded
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. Five reported
cases, three decided in the last three months of 1964, have sustained
a stockholder's derivative suit based upon section 10(b) and rule
10b-5.6 The significance of these decisions becomes apparent, not
only when one considers that the derivative suit has traditionally
been an internal corporate matter governed exclusively by state law,
but also when one focuses upon the compelling advantages which
accrue to the stockholder initiating his derivative action pursuant to
the above section and rule. Few of these advantages exist for the
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951).
3. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
4. Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960); Fratt v. Robinson, 203
F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953). See also Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1944).
5. Hooper v. Mountain States See. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 814 (1961); Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956); Speed v.
Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956); Beury v. Beury, 222 F.2d 464
(4th Cir. 1955); Fratt v. Robinson, supra note 4; Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co.,
188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951). Professor Louis Loss, the leading commentator in the
securities area, has called this recognition of implied liabilities "the most surprising
development in the whole area of civil liabilities under the SEC status." 3 Loss,
SFcUrTIES BEULATION 1757 (1961).
6. Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964); McClure v. Borne Chem.
Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3rd Cir. 1961); Kane v. Central Am. Mining & Oil, Inc., 235 F.
Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Dembitzer v. Republic Corp., CCH Fm). SE:C. L. REP.
f 91, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Stella v. Kaiser, 82 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
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private plaintiff suing directly pursuant to section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 because the states do not impose the same restrictions upon
direct action which they impose upon a derivative private action.
First, instead of grappling with the infinitely complex problems of
effecting jurisdiction and obtaining a suitable venue for trial under
state law, the stockholder suing derivatively pursuant to section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5 is able to utilize the nationwide jurisdictional and
venue provisions of section 27 of the act. Second, instead of being
required to post security for expenses, to obtain prior stockholder
authorization for suit or being hamstrung by a short statute of limita-
tions under state law, the stockholder suing derivatively pursuant to
the above section and rule is able to circumvent each of these
problems. Third, instead of being compelled to choose between a
derivative suit pursuant to state law and a derivative suit pursuant
to federal law, the stockholder who bases his derivative action on
federal rights may join his state cause of action to the federal claim
and maintain both in a federal court under the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction. The emergence of this stockholder's derivative action
based upon section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 with its circumvention of
restrictions so carefully erected by state legislatures and courts con-
fficts directly with strong state policies in favor of discouraging
derivative plaintiffs. This conflict has important ramifications in
certain areas of federalism, most particularly in the relations between
state and federal courts. This article will examine some of these
ramifications.
II. Tih TYPE oF CAsE
Rule 10b-5 is all embracing. It applies to any person, insider or
outsider, natural or artificial. It applies to any security, equity or
debt, whether or not exempted from registration, whether or not
traded on a national securities exchange or in the over-the-counter
markets, and whether or not the issuer is engaged solely in intrastate
commerce. It applies to both purchases and sales, and it reaches
frauds, misrepresentations and half truths, whether or not they are
sufficient to sustain a common law action for fraud and deceit, and
whether or not they are made through the use of the mails or the
facilities of interstate commerce or of a securities exchange, so long
as an interstate facility is used in connection with the purchase or
the sale. Clauses 1 and 3 of the rule contain express references to
fraud. In clause 1 devices and schemes to defraud are declared
unlawful, and in clause 3 acts and practices which operate as a fraud
are declared unlawful. Clause 2, however, is aimed particularly at
misstatements, half truths and non-disclosures. There is nothing on
1965 ]
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the face of clause 2 which refers to an intent to defraud.7
Five reported cases, three decided in the last three months of
1964, have expressly sustained the right of a stockholder to sue
derivatively on behalf of his corporation pursuant to section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5. In Ruckle v. Roto American Corp.,8 plaintiffs asserted
that certain insiders, by means of material omissions in their dis-
closures to the corporation's board of directors, defrauded the cor-
poration and caused it to issue securities designed to perpetuate the
insiders' control. In McClure v. Borne Chemical Co.,9 plaintiffs charged
that they had been fraudulently deprived of their preemptive rights
with respect to 10,000 shares of the corporation's stock, that said
shares were sold at an improperly low price, and that the defendants
engaged in certain manipulative practices affecting the market price
of the shares. In Dembitzer v. The First Republic Corp.,10 plaintiffs
contended that the individual defendants, all insiders, had caused the
corporation to circulate a fraudulent prospectus as a result of which
the corporation was induced to sell stock to the defendants in ex-
change for property worth far less than the stock. In Kane v. Central
American Mining & Oil, Inc.," the complaint asserted that defend-
ants, who were the sole officers and directors of the corporation,
looted the corporation and caused it to issue four million shares of
stock to themselves for little or no consideration. In Stella v. Kaiser,12
the defendants were charged with deliberate and negligent waste of
the corporation's funds in a futile attempt to stabilize the stock
preparatory to a public offering.
13
In each of the above cases, with the exception of Stella which
focussed upon the sections of the act dealing with manipulations
in auction markets, the basis for the derivative action was that domi-
nating hisiders had induced the corporation to issue shares to them-
selves or their designees at inadequate prices. Each complaint
bharged injury to the corporation as a defrauded seller. It would
appear that similar actions could be initiated where insiders issued
inordinate amounts of options to themselves on particularly favorable
7. ISRAELS, SEC PROBLEMS OF CONTROLLING STOCKnOLDErS AND IN UNDESIWIITINGS
140 (1962).
8. Supra note 6.
9. Supra note 6.
10. Supra note 6.
11. Supra note 6.
12. Supra note 6.
13. It is interesting to speculate as to just what extent the emergence of these
derivative actions pursuant to § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 will limit the "privity" doctrine
enunciated in Joseph Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y.
1951), aff'd per curiam, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952) and Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952). For a discussion of this problem, see 3 Loss,
op. cit. supra note 5, at 1767-71 (1961).
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terms. Similarly, suits could be maintained on behalf of corporations
induced by insiders motivated by selfish ends to purchase shares
at extraordinarily high prices. Such complaints would assert injury
to the corporation as a defrauded purchaser.
In the recent case of O'Neill v. Maytag,14 plaintiff, a stockholder
of National Airlines, brought a derivative action pursuant to section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 on behalf of National against a number of its
directors and officers and against Pan American World Airways, Inc.
In 1958, National had issued 400,000 shares of its Common Stock
to a trustee for the benefit of Pan American and Pan American in
return had issued 400,000 of its shares to a trustee for the benefit of
National. In 1960, the Civil Aeronautics Board found this cross-
ownership not to be in the public interest and ordered the companies
either to sell or to re-exchange the stock.'5 In compliance with this
order, a series of exchanges were consummated in 1963 at a one-to-one
ratio. Plaintiff alleged'that on the basis of New York Stock Exchange
quotations certain Pan American shares given up by National were
worth 12,906,400 dollars while the shares of its own stock received in
return were worth only 11,115,000 dollars. Plaintiff further alleged that
the individual defendants had induced National to pay this premium in
order to eliminate a large block of stock which threatened their con-
trol of National. In a 2-1 decision, Judge Hays dissenting, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that plaintiff
did not state a claim cognizable under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5
because no deception had been perpetrated by the defendants. The
court qualified its holding by stating that non-verbal acts may amount
to deception and that deception may not be required in cases involv-
ing securities brokers, dealers, or investment advisers.
O'Neill is the first derivative'action initiated on behalf of a corpora-
tion as a defrauded purchaser pursuant ,to section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 to be decided by a United States Court of Appeals. The decep-
tion standard, together with the qualifications enunciated by the
court, may prove difficult to apply in the future. In any event, the
substantive development of- principles based on rule 10b-5 in this
derivative area may well be extended beyond what is at present fore-
seeable. The point to be emphasized here, however, is that if one can
tailor his derivative action to fit the .broad language of rule .10b-5
he will be the beneficiary of a number of important advantages which
are discussed in this article.
14. 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
15. 31 C.A.B. 198 (1960).
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III. JUElSDICTION AND VENUE
Among the first problems to confront the stockholder who initiates
his derivative cause of action pursuant to state law are those relating
to jurisdiction and venue. As a rule plaintiff will prefer to commence
suit in the courts of the state wherein he resides. This is the juris-
diction in which his attorney practices, this is the law with which his
attorney is familiar, and this proximity will prove highly convenient
in the day to day conduct of the suit. If the individual defendants
are residents of the state in which he resides, plaintiff should have
little difficulty in effecting service of process. Where, however, none
of these defendants or only one or two of the less solvent defendants
reside in his state, plaintiff is faced with a problem. In most states,
if the defendant is a nonresident, a court can acquire jurisdiction
in personam only if the defendant appears or is personally served
within the state. To obtain jurisdiction in rem or quasi in rem, plain-
tiff must attach property of the defendant located within the state
and recovery is limited to the property attached. Moreover, in a
derivative suit the corporation in whose behalf plaintiff is suing is an
indispensable party to the action. If the corporation was incor-
porated in a foreign jurisdiction and is neither licensed to do business
nor doing business in the state wherein plaintiff resides, the corpora-
tion cannot be personally served within this state.16
Plaintiff may determine that his best chance of obtaining jurisdic-
tion over all of the defendants exists through a suit in the federal
courts.17 For convenience, and because in diversity cases the federal
courts will be guided by the substantive law of the forum state, plain-
tiff prefers to sue in the federal district court of the district in which
he resides. Assuming the 10,000 dollar jurisdictional requirement
poses no problem, plaintiff still must effect personal service upon the
individual defendants within the territorial limits of the state in which
the district court is held.'8 If the defendants do not enter this state,
personal service cannot be effected. If any of the defendants or the
corporation is a citizen of this state, the jurisdictional requirement of
complete diversity of citizenship between all plaintiffs and all de-
fendants is lost.
Plaintiff may now determine that his only chance is to sue the de-
fendants anywhere in the nation where he can obtain jurisdiction.
16. Jurisdiction in personam over such a foreign corporation may, however, be based
upon a general appearance, prior express assent or "implied consent" (e.g., under a
nonresident motorist statute).
17. One advantage is that under 28 U.S.C. § 1695 (1959), the corporation may be
served "in any district where it is organized or licensed to do business or is doing
business."
18. FED. R. Crv. P. 4(f).
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He is prepared to surrender the advantages and the convenience of
a suit in his home state. Assuming complete diversity of citizenship
exists between plaintiff on one hand and the corporation and the
individual defendants on the other hand, plaintiff may determine to
sue in the district wherein the corporation resides.19 In many cases,
however, it will be almost impossible to effect personal service upon
the individual defendants within the territorial limits of this state.
As a last alternative, plaintiff may determine to sue in the federal dis-
trict court of the state or district in which the defendants reside. If the
defendants reside in different states, however, plaintiff will be obli-
gated to choose which defendant he wishes to sue unless he is willing
to finance more than one lawsuit.
The preceding paragraphs in no way exhaust the problems relating
to jurisdiction and venue facing the stockholder suing derivatively
under state law. They are designed merely to outline the com-
plexity of certain issues in this area and to serve as a background
of comparison for the discussion of similar problems under section
27 of the act.
Section 27 reads in relevant part as follows:
Any criminal proceeding may be brought in the district wherein any act or
transaction constituting the violation occurred. Any suit or action to en-
force any liability or duty created by this title or rules and regulations there-
under, or to enjoin any violation of such title or rules and regulations, may
be brought in any such district or in the district wherein the defendant is
found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, and process in such cases may
be served in any other district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or
wherever the defendant may be found.
20
Under section 27, plaintiff may sue in the district in which he
resides provided an act or transaction constituting a violation of sec-
tion 10(b) and rule 10b-5 occurred there. And pursuant to the
legislative purpose of providing an accessible forum for imposing the
standards of the act, telephone calls from the forum district,21 trans-
mission of written confirmations, 22 mailings designed to lull the victims
into inaction23-all have been held by the courts to be sufficient to
support venue. Moreover, it is not even required that the telephone
calls or mailings themselves be fraudulent or deceptive. As the
19. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1401 (1959), stockholders may sue in any district "where
the corporation might have sued the same defendants."
20. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 63 Stat. 107 (1949), 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1958).
21. Matheson v. Armbrust, supra note 4. Clapp v. Stearns & Co., 229 F. Supp. 305
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).
22. Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., supra note 5.
23. United States v. Riedel, 126 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1942).
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Court 6f Appeals for the Fifth Circuit wrote in Hooper v. Mountain
States Securities Corp.:
The fraudulent scheme need not be hatched in the forum district. Nor
is it necessary that a false or deceptive or fraudulent paper be sent or state-
ment made through the use of the mails...
We think that any use of instrumentalities of the mails or other interstate
facilities made within the forum district constituting an important step in
the execution of the fraudulent, deceitful scheme or in its consummation
is sufficient. 24
In the event no "act or transaction constituting the violation 2 5
occurred in his home district, plaintiff may still maintain suit there
against any defendant who is "found or is an inhabitant or transacts
business"26 within the district. Here again the courts have followed
the legislative purpose of providing an accessible forum for imposing
the standards of the act. The incrustations and restrictions which
have grown up around the traditional "doing business" test have not
been extended to the words "transacts business."27 It was held in one
case that the president of a Delaware corporation and a Nevada cor-
poration with their principal places of business in Arizona was sub-
ject to suit in Pennsylvania on the ground that his selling stock to
persons in that state by use of the mails, interstate telegrams and
long-distance telephone calls constituted the transaction of business
in that state. The court wrote:
The quantum of business vhich must be transacted in a district to permit
the laying of venue therein is less than the 'doing business' necessary to
warrant a finding that the defendant is present, or is to be found, in the
district for jurisdictional purposes....
Furthermore, the mere solicitation of orders which are subject to ac.
ceptance or rejection in another state, from which the goods are shipped
directly, may constitute 'transacting business' for venue purposes.28
Similarly, a salesman in the Maryland branch office of a District
of Columbia partnership who had some transactions with residents
of the District, sent all his orders to and received confirmations
from the main office within the District, mailed literature into the
District with some regularity, and on occasion visited the main office
24. 282 F.2d 195, 204-05 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
25. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa (1958).
26. Ibid.
27. Kane v. Central Am. Mining & Oil, Inc., supra note 6, at 566.
28. SEC v. Wimer, 75 F. Supp. 955, 962 (W.D. Pa. 1948); See 3 Loss, op. cit. supra
note 5, at 2009-15.
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"transacted business" for venue purposes within the District of
Columbia.
29
Possibly because of the relative ease of satisfying either the "act
or transaction constituting the violation" or the "transacts business"
tests to establish venue, only one reported case has been decided
pursuant to section 27 and its almost identical counterpart in the
Securities Act of 193330 dealing definitively with the word "found"
and no reported cases have been decided pursuant to these sections
dealing definitively with the word "inhabitant" for venue purposes.
In United Industrial Corp. v. Nuclear Corp.,31 the court reasoned
that "found" had the same meaning for venue purposes in section 27
as it had for service of process purposes in that section and for
purposes of attachment of property under section 3506 of the Dela-
ware Code.32 "Since a defendant can be 'found' for purposes of
service under Section 27 only in a place where he is subject to in
personam service," the court wrote, "the same requirement exists
insofar as venue is concerned. Plantiff's argument that defendant
can be found within this District merely because he had property
here is not acceptable."
3 3
Section 27 contains a further provision which permits extraterri-
torial service of process "in any other district of which the defendant
is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found." This pro-
vision presents no problem of interpretation in its application to
individual defendants. Jurisdiction is established by personally serv-
ing these defendants anywhere within the nation where one can find
them. A defendant can be "found" for purposes of service pursuant
to section 27 in any place where he is subject to in personam service.3
Service upon a corporation, however, presents a slightly more com-
plicated question. It is settled that a corporation can be an inhabitant
only in the state of its incorporation.3 5 The word "found," however,
requires interpretation for corporate jurisdictional purposes. In Kane
v. Central American Mining & Oil, Inc., Judge Weinfeld analyzed
the meaning of "found" as used in section 27 for jurisdictional pur-
poses. He concluded that he was dealing with "a built-in venue and
process provision of the act which omitted any reference to 'doing
business."' 36 The court compared the service of process provision in
29. Uccellini v. Jones, 182 F. Supp. 375 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
30. Securities Exchange Act of 1933, § 22, 48 Stat. 86, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1958).
31. 237 F. Supp. 971 (D. Del. 1964).
32. DELx. CODE ANNm. tit. 10, § 3506 (1953).
33. United Industrial Corp. v. Nuclear Corp., 237 F. Supp. 971 (D. Del. 1964).
34. Ibid.
35. Sperry Products v. Association of Am. R.R., 132 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1942).
36. 235 F. Supp. 559, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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section 27 with the closely parallel section 12 of the Clayton Act
construed by the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Symphony Corp. :37
Section 27 here under consideration has an even broader venue provision
than that contained in Section 12 of the Clayton Act in that it also supports
venue in the district where the violation occurred. Considering the broad
remedial objective of the 1934 Act, it would be an anomaly to expand the
venue provision and at the same time to contract service of process amena-
bility. The conclusion is warranted that 'found' in Section 27 is to be given
at least the same broad content as that accorded it in the Clayton Act.3m
Judge Weinfeld went on to hold that a Panamanian corporation
created to exploit mining concessions in Honduras; which had been
occupied during its three year period of existence primarily with
raising capital to exploit its concessions; which had neither mined
any property nor promoted any sales of property anywhere in the
world; whose principal officers and entire Board of Directors were
residents of New York; which carried on corporate activities in New
York; which retained a New York attorney who rendered continual
corporate legal services in New York; which held three stockholders'
meetings and one meeting of directors within New York; which pre-
pared and mailed the notices for these meetings from New York;
which mailed further communications to its stockholders from New
York bearing a New York return address; and which prepared a regis-
tration statement in New York for filing with the Securities and
Exchange Commission, was probably not "doing business" within
New York in the traditional sense, but was "found" in New York for
purposes of service of process pursuant to the act.
IV. PRIOR DEMAND, SECURITY FOR COSTS,
STATUTE OF LIMrrATIONS
Once having resolved whom he is able to sue and where he is
able to sue them from the viewpoint of jurisdiction and venue, the
stockholder who initiates his derivative cause of action pursuant to
state law is faced with certain additional problems. First, he must
allege with particularity in his complaint that he has exhausted his
remedies within the corporation by making a sufficient demand upon
the directors to sue or giving sufficient reason for not so doing.39 And
if in the honest and impartial opinion of the directors, the best
37. 333 U.S. 795 (1948).
38. 325 F. Supp. 559, 566-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
39. Wathen v. Jackson Oil & Refining Co., 235 U.S. 635 (1915); Hawes v. Oakland,
104 U.S. 450 (1881); Stone v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 56 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.
1932).
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interests of the corporation do not justify the derivative action, their
decision is a bar to plaintiff's suit.40 Second, in certain instances
plaintiff must also apply to the stockholders as a body. He must
attempt to convene a stockholders' meeting so that a majority of
shareholders, if not implicated in the wrong, may vote upon the
question of suit.41  This latter requirement is particularly burden-
some and often results in large expenditures of time and money.
Moreover, the law of certain jurisdictions effectively bars a derivative
action unless it is approved by an independent majority of stock-
holders.4 2 Third, in certain jurisdictions if plaintiff does not hold a
required percentage of the corporation's outstanding shares, or the
shares held by plaintiff do not have a certain market value, plaintiff
is required to post a bond as security for the estimated expenses of
those defending the suit.43 It should be emphasized that a security-
for-expense requirement creates a liability. When a bond is posted
and the derivative suit is unsuccessful for any reason, including a
failure on technical grounds that do not go to the merits, the corpora-
tion has recourse to the security for indemnification of its own liti-
gation expenses and those expenses for which it might be ordered
by a court to reimburse its directors, officers and employees. Fourth,
in certain jurisdictions plaintiff may be hamstrung by a short statute
of limitations designed especially to discourage derivative actions.44
Finally, plaintiff may be faced with the antiquated requirements of
an ancient state code of procedure with circumscribed rights of plead-
ing and discovery.
45
40. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917);
Post v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 200 Fed. 918 (8th Cir. 1912).
41. Hawes v. Oakland, supra note 39; Yates Ranch Oil & Royalties v. Jones, 100 F.2d
419 (5th Cir. 1938); Stone v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods. Inc., supra note 39.
42. Hausman v. Buckley, 299 F.2d 696 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 885 (1962);
S. Solomont & Sons Trust, Inc. v. New England Theatres Operating Corp., 326 Mass.
99, 93 N.E.2d 241 (1950).
43. Statutory provisions to this effect have been adopted in California, CAL. CORP.
CODE § 834; Maryland, MARYLA-D RULES OF PROCEDURE 328 (1963); New Jersey,
N.J. REv. STAT. § 14:3-15 (1945); New York, Bus. CORP. LAw § 627; Pennsylvania,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1322 (1959); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. § 180.405(4) (1957).
44. Michigan has a statute of limitations which provides in substance that no director
shall be held liable for any delinquency in his fiduciary duties "after six years from the
date of such delinquency, or after two years from the time when such delinquency is
discovered by one complaining thereof, whichever shall sooner occur (emphasis added)."
MicH. STAT. ANN. § 21.47 (1963). See also Wolf v. Thomas, 271 F.2d 634 (6th Cir.
1959). In New York, old § 48(8) of the Civil Practice Act imposed a special statute
of limitations of six years on any legal or equitable action brought by or on behalf of a
corporation against a director, officer or stockholder. The principal effect of § 48(8)
was to remove the normal ten year limitation that existed for suits in equity. On
September 1, 1963, this ten year statute of limitations for suits in equity was shortened
to six years.
45. In Massachusetts, for example, there is no provision for oral interrogatories.
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 231, § 61 (1956). In New York, an attorney cannot depose a
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If plaintiff, still attempting to base his derivative cause of action
upon state law, is able to satisfy the monetary and diversity juris-
dictional requirements of the federal courts, his only advantage will
be utilization of the liberal pleading and discovery procedures of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Each of the other problems
discussed above will continue to plague him. Prior demand,46 security
for expenses47 and statutes of limitation" are all matters of "substance"
under the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,49 and hence wil be
applied in the federal courts in diversity cases in the identical manner
in which they would be applied in a state court.
Assume, however, that plaintiff determines to initiate his derivative
cause of action pursuant to section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. The ad-
vantages are compelling. First, plaintiff will be able to utilize the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with its liberal rules relating to
pleading and discovery.50 Second, plaintiff will not be required to
post security for expenses. 51 Third, while plaintiff will be obliged to
comply with rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as
regards prior demand upon directors and stockholders, the require-
ments of this rule are not nearly so demanding or restrictive as the
requirements of certain states and foreign jurisdictions.52 In Massa-
chusetts, for example, a derivative action is barred unless it is ap-
proved by an independent majority of stockholders.5 3 A similar rule
prevails in Venezuela5 and in Panama.55 Pursuant to rule 23(b),
however, demand upon stockholders is usually required only where
a majority of the stockholders may ratify the alleged wrong. 6 And
when such a demand would be "an idle ceremony" the plaintiff may
forego this condition precedent to suit.57 Fourth, the federal courts in
applying rule 10b-5 may well choose to be guided by the traditional
equitable doctrine of laches rather than a short state statute of
witness, as distinguished from a party, over the objection of opposing counsel without
the court's permission upon a showing of good cause. N.Y. CIV. PnAc. LAW art. 31.
46. Hausman v. Buckley, supra note 42.
47. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
48. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
49. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 8-10, 26-37.
51. Fielding v. Allen, 181 F.2d 163 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Ogden Corp. v.
Fielding, 340 U.S. 817 (1950). See also McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., supra note 6.
52. Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961
(1965).
53. Carroll v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 141 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1956);
S. Solomont & Sons Trust, Inc. v. New England Theatres Operating Corp., supra
note 42.
54. Hausman v. Buckley, supra note 42..
55. Kane v. Central Am. Mining & Oil Co, Inc., supra note 6.
56. HENS, ConoRArxoNs 577 (1961).
57. 3 Moore, FEDERAL PnAcnTcE 23.19, at 3529 (1964).
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limitations applicable only to derivative actions.-8 The reasoning in
each of these cases is that the stockholder's derivative right, as well
as the right of the corporation in whose behalf the stockholder is
suing, are federal rights which should not be emasculated by the laws
of fifty states and countless foreign jurisdictions. Hence, the restric-
tions in state or foreign law designed to limit the stockholder's deriva-
tive action are not applied to a derivative suit based upon section
10(b) and rule 10b-5.59
V. PENDENT JURISDICTION
The stockholder who determines to base his derivative cause of
action upon section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 is not obliged to abandon
any grounds for recovery which he may have under state law.
Pursuant to the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, a federal court which
would not otherwise have subject matter jurisdiction of a state-
created ground for recovery may have such jurisdiction conferred
upon it by virtue of the fact that the state-created ground for recovery
is asserted together with a federal ground for recovery to vindicate
a violation of the same right.60 In addition, a federal court, which
would not otherwise be a proper venue for adjudicating the state-
created ground for recovery, may adjudicate the same provided venue
for the federal ground for recovery is properly laid in that court.61
In the-leading decision of Hum v. Oursler,62 a distinction was noted
between a case where two distinct grounds for recovery in support
of a single cause of action are alleged, only one of which presents a
federal question, and a case where two separate and distinct causes
of action are alleged, only one of which- is federal in character. The
court stated that in the former situation, if the federal question is not
plainly wanting in substance, the federal court may retain and dispose
of the case upon both the federal and non-federal grounds; but if two
distinct causes of action are stated, the court may not adjudicate
the non-federal cause of action.
A recent decision illustrates how far this proposition of law may
be extended in the securities area for the benefit of the derivative
plaintiff. In Rogers v. Valentine,63 plaintiff alleged derivatively that
58. Holmberg v. Arrnbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395, 397 (1946); Hooper v. Mountain
States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960).
59. Levitt v. Johnson, supra note 52; Fielding v. Allen, supra note 51; Kane v. Central
Am. Mining & Oil, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
60. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
61. Bradford Novelty Co. v. Manheim, 156 F. Supp. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); 1 MooRE,
FEDERAL InACT CE 1f 0.140(8), at 1339-40 (1961).
62. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
63. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 91,473 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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defendant (i) had violated section 16(b) of the act"4 by failing to
file notices of purchases of securities as required by section 16(a)
of the act65 within ten days following the end of the month in which
the purchases were consummated; and (ii) had violated fiduciary
duties created by state law by selling control stock to outsiders at a
premium. The court granted summary judgment for defendant with
regard to the first allegation, but retained the second allegation for
trial on the merits pursuant to the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.
This decision appears dubious on two grounds. First, any right of
action which lies pursuant to section 16(b) of the act for recovery of
short-term, insider, trading profits is entirely separate and distinct
from a right of action charging breach of fiduciary duties through
the sale of control stock at a premium. Second, the allegation that a
late filing pursuant to section 16(a) of the act gives rise to liability
under section 16(b) is "plainly wanting in substance."6 There is
absolutely no basis for such a contention in the statute.67 Moreover,
the experienced corporate practitioner is well aware that many reports
filed pursuant to section 16(a) are filed after the ten day statutory
period due to administrative carelessness or simply because the
signatures required for these reports cannot always be expeditiously
obtained. Section 16(b) liability has never been held to exist in
such cases.
Perhaps the most widely litigated issue in this area of pendent
jurisdiction at the present time is the question of whether or not
extraterritorial service of process effected pursuant to the federal
ground for recovery suffices to confer in personam jurisdiction with
respect to the state ground for recovery. The authorities are split. 8
In International Ladies Garment Workers Union v. Shields & Co.,69
plaintiff sued defendants for misrepresentations in connection with
the sale of certain bonds alleging violations of the securities acts as
well as state common law. The court held that although it had
pendent jurisdiction of the ground for recovery under state law, such
64. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16, 48 Stat. 896, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1958).
65. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16, 48 Stat. 896, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1958).
66. Hum v. Oursler, supra note 60.
67. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16, 48 Stat. 896, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) & (b)
(1958).
68. As authority for the proposition that a federal court cannot hear and determine
the state ground for recovery unless it has independent jurisdiction of the person of the
defendant, see Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 236 F. Supp. 801 (D.C. Colo.
1964); International Ladies Garment Workers v. Shields & Co., 209 F. Supp. 145
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); Phillips v. Murchison, 194 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Lasch v.
Antkies, 161 F. Supp. 851 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
69. 209 F. Supp. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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pendent jurisdiction of the subject matter did not include pendent
jurisdiction of the person. Thus, defendants who were served extra-
territorially in connection with the federal ground for recovery could
not be held to answer the common law claim. The court's reasoning
was succinctly stated in the following paragraphs:
To extend the rule of pendent jurisdiction to jurisdiction over the person
calls into play different considerations. The doctrine of Hum v. Oursler
flows of necessity from the conception that there is but a single claim where
a single right has been violated. Where the subject matter is a single
claim and the court has jurisdiction of the claim it has jurisdiction of the
whole subject matter. As we see here, however, there may be plural rights
of action to enforce a single claim. As far as the court's jurisdiction of the
subject matter is concerned, it has jurisdiction to enforce all those rights
of action. The court's jurisdiction over the person, though, is usually limited
by Rule 4(f) to jurisdiction over those who can be served within the state.
While Congress has made an exception to that in the case of the federal
right of action asserted here so far as the common law right of action is
concerned, the limitation to those who can be served within the state still
stands. There is no such compulsion of logic here as exists in the case of
jurisdiction over the subject matter; a claim for the violation of a single
right is indivisible but the rights to enforce it are divided at their creation
into different rights of action.
The result accords with what would be the natural intent of Congress.
When Congress subjected those sued for a violation of the Securities Ex-
change Act to the necessity of responding to service made outside the state it
would normally hesitate to force their appearance far from home to defend
against demands under laws the degree of severity or intricacy of which
were unknown to Congress.
70
The majority view, however, appears to be that considerations of
judicial economy and convenience of the parties which underlie the
pendent jurisdiction doctrine require that extraterritorial service of
process be sustained as to the nonfederal pendent claims.71 As Judge
Feinberg wrote in Cooper v. North Jersey Trust Co.:
Reasons of judicial economy-which justify the judicially created doctrine
of pendent jurisdiction-suggest sustaining the service of process as to the
pendent nonfederal claims. See Note, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 762 (1963).
The same basic facts will have to be presented on both federal and non-
federal theories. Service on the federal claims is proper and defense of these
claims must, in any event, be made in this District.
72
Such a view is extremely advantageous to the derivative plaintiff.
So long as his federal ground for recovery is not "plainly wanting in
70. Id. at 148. (Emphasis added.)
71. Schwartz v. Eaton, 264 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1959); Kane v. Central Am. Mining
& Oil, Inc., supra note 59. Cooper v. North Jersey Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972
(S.D.N.Y. 1964); Townsend Corp v. Davidson, 222 F. Supp. 1 (D.N.J. 1963).
72. Cooper v. North Jersey Trust Co., supra note 71. (Emphasis added.)
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substance,"73 the stockholder may assert his rights derivatively pur-
suant to section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 and thereby obtain a federal
forum to hear state-created grounds for recovery asserted against
defendants immune from suit in a state court for lack of in personam
jurisdiction.
VI. CONCLUSION
The effects of permitting a derivative suit with the attendant ad-
vantages based upon section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 may be far-
reaching. As more and more actions are initiated and decided, a sub-
stantial body of federal common law will grow up around this
section and rule. The extent to which this federal, common, corporate
law will conflict with state law cannot be clearly predicted. The
outlines of such a conflict, however, are already discernible in similar
actions recently decided under the securities acts. In J. 1. Case Co. v.
Borak 4 plaintiff sued pursuant to section 14(a) of the act seeking to
void a corporate merger on the grounds that the proxy material used
in soliciting votes was misleading. The United States Supreme Court
sustained the suit writing as follows:
[W]e believe that the overriding federal law applicable here would,
where the facts required, control the appropriateness of redress despite
the provisions of state corporation law. . . . [Iff the law of the state
happened to attach no responsibility to the use of misleading proxy state-
ments, the whole purpose of the section might be frustrated. Furthermore,
the hurdles that the victim might face (such as separate suits .. . bring-
ing in all parties necessary for complete relief, etc.) might well prove in-
superable to effective relie 75
Similarly, in Levitt v. Johnson76 the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit resolved a conflict between the policies under-
lying the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Massachusetts
requirement of prior stockholder authorization for a derivative suit
in the following words:
[T]he question is whether the act contemplated or impliedly forbade the
application to the assertion of derivative rights of what the court concluded
to be a 'strict Massachusetts rule.' In this connection we note in section
1(b) a clear declaration of policy. The act is directed to 'the national
public interest and interest of investors . . .adversely affected,' and its
'purposes ...with which [its] provisions ...shall be interpreted, are to
mitigate and, so far as is feasible, to eliminate the conditions enumerated.'
(ital. supplied.) We do not see how it can be gainsaid that any substantial
73. Hum v. Oursler, supra note 60, at 246.
74. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
75. Id. at 434-35.
76. Supra note 52.
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,stiffening of the conditions precedent to the" bringing of stockholders' suits
above normal requirements would conflict with this broad declaration.
The district court's reasoning that since the stockholder's right is a derivative
one his right to bring suit must be controlled by the local law of the state
of incorporation in the absence of an explicit congressional direction to the
contrary negates the intendment of the act and underestimates the role to
be played by the federal courts in the implementation of national regulatory
legislation.
77
Other potential areas of conflict are not difficult to foresee. First,
the fact that a derivative suit, barred by a state statute of limitations,
may be heard in a federal court under the doctrine of Holmberg v.
Armbrecht 8 is likely to prove a future source of friction. Second, the
lack of a security for expenses requirement in derivative suits based
upon section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 may open a federal forum to certain
plaintiffs who lack appreciable stockholdings and financial resources.
This, like the Holmberg doctrine, may conflict with a strong state
policy in favor of discouraging derivative suits. Indeed, the federal
courts in sustaining a derivative action pursuant to section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5 may well have opened a Pandora's box of problems. While
the protection of the minority stockholder from the fraud of corporate
insiders is a legitimate interest and should be upheld, the prevention
of harassing "strike suits" is an equally legitimate interest worthy of
protection.7 9 Third, confidential corporate information, inaccessible to
the derivative plaintiff under limited state rules of discovery, may be
elucidated in a federal court under the liberal discovery provisions
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Such information, particularly
complex financial data, could tip the scales in plaintiffs favor in an
action for corporate waste or mismanagement.
77. Id. at 819.
78. 327 U.S. 392 (1946). This is the doctrine that in federal equity cases the court
will be guided by the traditional standard of laches rather than a state statute of limita-
tions.
79. Governor Dewey of New York, in submitting certain bills designed to curb
derivative actions to the New York State Legislature, made the following comments:
"These two bills represent an effort to meet the problem created by the baseless
so-called 'strike' stockholder suit against corporation directors and officers.
In recent years a veritable racket of baseless lawsuits accompanied by many unethical
practices has grown up in this field. Worse yet, many suits that were well based have
been brought, not in the interest of the corporation or of its stockholders, but in
order to obtain money for particular individuals who had no interest in the corporation
or in its stockholders. Secret settlements-really pay-offs for silence-have been the
subjects of common suspicion.
Tese bills represent a healthy experiment in cleansing our law courts of disreputable
practices .... " Memorandum filed with Senate Bills Nos. 1314, 1315 (April 9, 1944).
Illustrative of the groundless "strike suit" which recent developments under § 10(b)
and rule lOb-5 may engender is Leighton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 340 F.2d 859
(2d Cir. 1965).
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This conflict between federal and state law will lead inevitably to
different decisions being rendered by state and federal courts in
similar cases. The policies underlying Erie R.t1. v. Tompkins, 0 which
urge that for the same transaction the accident of a suit in a federal
court instead of in a state court across the street should not lead to a
substantially different result, will be undercut as derivative stock-
holders "statute shop" to bring their suits in the federal courts pur-
suant to section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Moreover, one will be faced
with an anomalous situation where stockholders of a corporate entity,
authorized and created under state law, will be enforcing their
derivative rights pursuant to a rule promulgated by a federal agency
under powers granted by a federal statute. And under the doctrine
of pendent jurisdiction federal judges will be deciding cases pursuant
to peculiar state laws against defendants who have been drawn from
all over the nation by the long-arm jurisdictional provisions of section
27 of the act. Finally, one may see a substantial number of additional
cases burdening the federal courts as derivative stockholders strive
to take advantage of the strong federal policies of preventing fraud
and deceit in connection with the purchase and sale of securities
embodied in section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.
80. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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